Resumo: É importante para a sociedade a luta contra a estupidez, porque o estúpido é constitutivamente destrutivo. Mas aquele que luta contra a estupidez, própria e alheia, é, sobretudo, tradicionalmente, o filósofo. Vamos constatar a presença dessa luta em Nietzsche, e perscrutar a relevância que teria em sua obra, em geral pouco ressaltada. Nietzsche se une à linhagem clássica da denúncia da estupidez, extremando-a ao modulá-la nos termos de seu perspectivismo como incapacidade de “sair” da perspectiva única. Além disso, procederemos a descobrir uma classe de estupidez que acompanha a sabedoria como sua sombra necessária e que seria a que nos abre, diante do cristianismo paulino e erasmista, a possibilidade de uma ciência alegre. Por outro lado, a estupidez cósmica teria o bonito nome de “necessidade”, e o dionisíaco do pensamento do eterno retorno radica sobretudo no amor fati, que em nosso caso se traduziria como afirmação e ainda amor da estupidez. Por isso Nietzsche dirá que a sabedoria dionisíaca é o princípio da maior estupidez possível.

Abstract: It is important for society to fight against stupidity because the stupid is constitutively destructive. But the one who fights against stupidity, his own and that of others, is, above all, traditionally the philosopher. Let us note the presence of this struggle in Nietzsche, and realise the relevance it would have in his work, which in general is little emphasised. Nietzsche joins the classical line of denouncing stupidity, although he does so to an extreme by modulating it in terms of his perspectivism as an inability to “get out” of the single perspective. Moreover, he is going to discover a kind of stupidity that accompanies wisdom as its necessary shadow and that would be the one that opens for us, in the face of Pauline and Erasmist Christianity, the possibility of a joyful science. On the other hand, cosmic stupidity would have the beautiful name of “necessity”, and the Dionysian aspect of the thought of the eternal return lies above all in the amor fati, which in our case would be translated as affirmation and even love of stupidity. That is why Nietzsche will say that Dionysian wisdom is the principle of the greatest possible stupidity.

Abstract: Based on The Gay Science’s last book, in this paper I proceed, first, to set the features of the new Nietzschean understanding of belief as an active determining opposed to the claim of truth traditionally understood as correction or adjustment of representation. That is to say, belief understood, in an important even though paradoxical sense, as counterbelief. Second, I aim to characterize although roughly what could be considered as the specifically Nietzschean belief, constitutive of his philosophical production’s core meaning. We should call that "belief" the "Dionysian faith", in the understanding that fixing and defining it would be strictly speaking rather impossible, since it does not exclude anything, not even its opposites.

Resumen: A partir del último libro de La gaya ciencia en este trabajo procedo, en primer lugar, a fijar los rasgos del nuevo entendimiento nietzscheano de la creencia en cuanto un determinar activo contrapuesto a la pretensión de verdad entendida como corrección o ajuste de la representación, es decir, en cuanto contracreencia. En segundo lugar, caracterizo a grandes rasgos lo que hay que considerar como creencia específicamente nietzscheana, constitutiva del sentido nuclear de su producción filosófica. Debemos denominar "fe dionisíaca" a esa "creencia", en el entendido de que resulta imposible fijarla y definirla en un sentido estricto porque no excluiría nada, ni siquiera a sus opuestos.

This paper explores some of the issues related to Wittgenstein's famous comment to Drury -that he himself, while not a religious person, could not avoid contemplating all questions from a religious perspective- that might contribute to an understanding of the final meaning of the philosophical practice distinctive of Wittgenstein's last period. This paper aims at showing that final meaning is the immunization of the religious form of the life. In order to reach this conclusion we will first recall the importance of clarity as an absolute goal of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and see how it is connected to a specific attitude toward the explanatory claims of conventional philosophy. Then we will summarize the essence of Wittgenstein's philosophical analysis of religious discourse and review some crucial texts that highlight the peculiar religiosity unique to Wittgenstein.

Este artículo analiza ciertas interpretaciones del célebre comentario de Wittgenstein a Drury, sin duda relevantes para comprender el sentido de la filosofía del pensador vienés en su último periodo, según el cual él mismo, sin ser una persona religiosa, no podía evitar contemplar todas las cuestiones desde una perspectiva religiosa. Los pasos para identificar la razón por la que se puede afirmar que la inmunización de la forma de vida religiosa constituye el sentido último de la filosofía concebida como análisis de los juegos de lenguaje serán, en primer lugar, poner en relación el valor supremo de la claridad con la crítica de la actitud explicativa característica de la filosofía convencional y, en segundo término, considerar el análisis del discurso religioso y la peculiar religiosidad del propio Wittgenstein.